The wireless technology has revolutionized and had a significant impact on every aspect of people's life. Confidential information, financial transactions, and sensitive conversations are frequent via the wireless network and securing all these data are of the utmost importance. In this paper, we discuss the major weaknesses of the long-term evolution (LTE) authentication process and propose a new approach-the hybrid evolved packet system (HEPS) protocol to address the vulnerabilities. The proposed protocol has been verified logically, using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic, and systematically, using the automated validation of internet security protocol and application tool. The HEPS protocol will optimize the performance of the LTE authentication process and fundamentally solve the security issue of the process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Long Term Evolution (LTE) has become a ubiquitous wireless technology as the network coverage and data transmission rate advanced significantly over the years. It was defined by the 3 rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) as the 4G broadband mobile wireless networks for mobile devices and data access point. According to statistic by OpenSignal.com [1] , LTE is dominating all over the world, especially in Asian countries, with penetration rate of 97% in South Korea, 90% in Japan, 86% in Hong Kong and 84% in Singapore. LTE subscriber rate in other big markets like United States, China, Australia are around 75-80% [1] . The capability of LTE networks comes from the novelty in system architecture design: flat IP connectivity, flexible spectrum allocation, integration of multi-antenna and efficient controls over power and interference [2] . Wide bandwidth distribution and ability to support multiple duplexing scheme (FDD and TDD) allow LTE to have enhanced capacity, lower latency and higher data rate compared to previous cellular networks and interworking communication with existing wireless network is effortless [3] . While these developments in system design has improved the capacity and performance of the networks significantly, security
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Tai-Hoon Kim. challenges also arise. As monetarize transaction, confidential information exchange is frequent via the LTE network every day, breach in security in LTE network will cause tremendous impact to hundreds of millions of users and it is crucial to safeguard the security of the network. Thus, securing the LTE system is of the same importance as improving its capacity and performance.
LTE system has some vulnerability on system architecture, access and handover procedure, multi-media (IMS) and Machine Type Communication (MTC) security mechanisms [2] . The most important and vulnerable step is the access authentication process and several kinds of attacks can be launched against a network if an adversary is able to pass the authentication process and falsely recognized as legitimate user.
Multiple papers have been reviewed and integrated with personal observations to identify existing problems in the current LTE access authentication protocol, EPS-AKA protocol. It has been identified in [6] that disclosure of user identify (IMSI) is one of the most critical weakness of EPS-AKA protocol. Key dependency is highlighted in [7] and [8] as another weakness of EPS-AKA process. The current key derivation procedure has strong dependency on the long-term shared secret between user and home network server which introduced a single point of failure to the authentication process. It is also emphasized in [9] that the current LTE access procedure is also vulnerable to Man In The Middle (MITM) attack due to the lack of protection of information transmission sent via both the wire and wireless interfaces. The analysis in [9] and [10] have identified serving network identity ID M disclosure to be another vulnerability of LTE access procedure. According to the analysis in [11] and [12] , EPS-AKA protocol is also vulnerable to different other types of attacks like replay attack or Denial of Service (DoS). As disclosure of User Identity, lack of Perfect Forward Secrecy (Key Dependency) and bandwidth consumption are the three most critical problems, some researchers have developed some solutions to address these three most significant problems.
To resolve IMSI catching issue, many proposals have tried to leverage on symmetric encryption [8] , [9] , [13] . By using symmetric key cryptography, the encryption and decryption time delay is low, however, another challenge arises due to the difficulty in generation and managing the symmetric key. Many implementations of asymmetric key cryptography was proposed to address IMSI catching problem [14] , [15] . It has been proved that asymmetric cryptography is a reasonable option in protecting user identity. It is noted that the usage should be minimized and light-weighted cryptography algorithms to make sure that the implementation of asymmetric key cryptography would not add too much overhead to the process. Choudhury et al. [6] has introduced another method to protect IMSI, which is to transmit a Dynamic Mobile Subscriber Identity (DMSI) whenever IMSI is required. Although this approach can prevent IMSI catching, the relative complexity due to the use of several new cryptographic functions may extend the overall delay of the process or even cause authentication failure.
As in EPS-AKA protocol, the shared key between user device and home network server is retained for a long term, the shared key protection mechanism, namely Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), is necessary. Alezabi et al. [13] claims how to have PFS in EPS-AKA protocol. Cao et al. [16] have implemented ECDH in the communication between UE and an Access Point (AP) about handover authentication and key agreement. Abdo et al. [8] use the ECDH algorithm in 3G-WLAN interworking authentication and key agreement. Although the hybrid key exchange schemes like DH/ECDH is implemented in some proposal for different authentication context to address the lack of PFS issue, there is no application mention in LTE access procedure.
There is no existing proposal that explicitly addresses Sequence Number (SQN) desynchronization and bandwidth consumption issue in EPS-AKA. However, some ideas are implemented in other authentication. Group authentication and 3G-WLAN interworking will be discussed to analyze this issue. The SE-AKA protocol described in [17] is proposed for group authentication in LTE network. A similar approach is found in the authentication protocol for 3G-WLAN interworking [8] . Although allocating the authentication responsibility to MME can minimize bandwidth consumption between MME and HSS. It also increases computation requirements in MME and UE. Even though removing SQN and AVs to save power and bandwidth resources introduces more computation requirement to MME and UE, the advantages of this method outweighs the disadvantages and the constantly enhancing capability of mobile devices will make this approach more feasible.
In this paper, we propose a new protocol, named Evolved Packet System (HEPS) protocol, for the authentication procedure of LTE system to address the aforementioned security and vulnerability issues. First, we use a hybrid cryptographic approach in the protocol to resolve IMSI catching issue. Compared with existing solutions, our protocol minimizes the use of asymmetric encryption and implements light-weight algorithm to shorten the overall delay of the process. Second, we apply the hybrid key exchange algorithm EDCH in the protocol to calculate the session key to enforce Perfect Forward Secrecy. Third, we eliminate the use of SQN and AVs by delegating authentication responsibility to MME to solve the SQN desynchronization and bandwidth consumption issue in the new protocol.
This paper is organized as follows. In the section II, we introduce the system model and provide a technical background knowledge on LTE/LTE-A networks and cryptography for easier understanding on security functions in access procedure. Vulnerability of existing network protocol will also be discussed. In section III, we introduce the Hybrid Evolved Packet System (HEPS) protocol with detailed explanation on each message exchanged in individual stage of the authentication process. In section IV, we provide the summary of the verification process of HEPS protocols using axiomatic system -BAN logic and AVISPA analyzer. In section V, we provide the strength of HEPS protocol in terms of overhead and resource consumption with simulation from MATLAB. Finally, in section VI, we conclude the paper with future recommendations.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
LTE system architecture comprises of two networksEvolved Packet Core (EPC) and the Evolved-Universal Terrestrial Access Network (E-UTRAN). The radio access network E-UTRAN is a network of eNodeBs (eNBs) connected via X2 interface [4] . The core network EPC contains the Mobile Management Entities (MMEs), Serving Gateway (S-GW) and Packet Data Network Gateway (P-GW) [5] . The eNB-MME and MME-HSS connections are through SI-MME and S6a interfaces respectively. The system model is shown as Fig. 1 .
The entities engaged in the authentication process are: User Equipment (UE) -Mobile or other wireless equipment owned by the user. A Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) is install in each UE and is used to store and generate information for authentication procedure. UE communicates with the core network via E-UTRAN network.
Home Subscriber Server (HSS) -Home network server that includes the Authentication Center (AuC). AuC contains authentication information of every registered UE of Mobile Management Entity (MME) -MME represents the serving network and plays the role of routing authentication information to the home network (HSS) and selecting S-GW and P-GW for the UE user plane. In authentication process, message exchanged between UE and MME are delivered by the network of eNBs. MME talks to HSS via the S6a interface.
When a user request to connect to LTE networks, MME will represent EPC to perform authentication using the Evolved Packet System Authentication and Key Agreement (EPS-AKA). This protocol is developed based on the Universal Mobile Telecommunication System AKA (UMTS-AKA) process. EPS-AKA has some greater improvements over UMTS-AKA, which makes the protocol resistant to redirection and rogue base station attacks. However, it still unable to fully prevent other attacks like Dos or MITM [2] . EPS-AKA also inherits some shortcomings of UMTS standards like the lack of user identify (IMSI) protection, additional bandwidth consumption and sequence number (SQN) desynchronization.
III. HEPS PROTOCOL
To address the aforementioned security and vulnerability issues, we propose a new access protocol for LTE system, named Evolved Packet System (HEPS) protocol based on the existing solutions. Next, we will discuss the newly proposed protocol in detail. The proposed protocol, HEPS, uses a hybrid cryptographic approach where asymmetric key cryptography is implemented to enforce security but its usage is minimized to improve performance. The idea of using Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used in several existing solutions [7] , [10] , [14] . However, PKI require a significant cost to set up and it causes more delay in usage compared to symmetric key cryptography. The HEPS protocol minimizes the use of asymmetric encryption and implements light-weight algorithm like ECDH to improve performance of the process. The hybrid key exchange algorithm EDCH is applied in session key calculation to enforce Perfect Forward Secrecy. The protocol also eliminates the use of SQN and AVs by delegating authentication responsibility to MME to solve the SQN desynchronization and bandwidth consumption issue. To fulfill both security and performance requirements, the security parameters and mechanisms must be chosen carefully.
A. NOMENCLATURE AND ASSUMPTIONS
The related nomenclature and assumptions are listed as follows:
1) NOMENCLATURE

2) ASSUMTIONS
• Public key infrastructure is implemented. The public key PKh of HSS is distributed to legal MME and UE entities
• The following hash functions are published: H 1 , H 2 , H 3 .
• The following key generation functions are published: g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g
• ECDH key exchange parameters and functions are published: elliptic curve E/F P , mapping function P B. DETAILED EXPLANATION 1) PHASE 1: PRE-AUTHENTICATION PHASE Setups in serving and home networks need to be done before authentication. Since the network is wireless, it is easier for an adversary to manipulate the messages exchanged to impersonate a legal entity. Therefore, identity verification is essential in wireless network access authentication. The following setup will help each entity in the authentication process to verify the identity and trustworthiness of others. Detailed conditions are explained below:
• HSS maintains registered user information in its database which contains the long-term shared secret key K and user permanent identity IMSI. Only user who can provide the exact value of these security parameters are authenticated and allowed to enter the network This set up is the basis of the whole authentication process.
• HSS maintains a list of authorized MME's identities in its database. Only authentication request coming from these MME are processed by HSS. This pre-authentication set up will help to prevent fake serving network.
• MME acknowledges a list of authorized eNodeBs (eNBs) identities which only sends and receives messages from these eNBs. This set up will prevent forge eNB attack, which is a very common malicious attack in LTE wireless network. When the user enters the VOLUME 7, 2019 coverage of the serving network, MME sends a User Identity Request via an authorized eNBs to start authentication phase.
2) PHASE 2: AUTHENTICATION PHASE 1. eNB to UE: User Identity Request MME sends the user identity request to UE via eNB 2. UE to MME: User Identity Response (AUTH U , MAC U , ID HSS ) UE calculates the identity parameters and send it back to MME. User permanent identity IMSI is encrypted using HSS's public key. ID HSS is included in the message to give MME guidance on where to transmit the message. The message contains an integrity check component MAC U so that HSS can determine if the message is manipulated during transmission. The parameters are calculated as follow:
• UE generate random number RAND U and current timestamp T U
MAC U , {ID M , EK M , T M }_PKh) MME forwards UE identity information to HSS and attaches its own ID M for verification. It also sends a symmetric key EK M for subsequent communication with HSS. A timestamp T M is included in the message to inform HSS that the symmetric key is fresh and is created for the current session. These additional information is encrypted using HSS's public key to ensure only HSS has access to MME identity and symmetric key.
HSS to MME: Authentication Data Response (AUTH H , MAC H , [EK, T H ]_EK M
• HSS first verifies MME base on ID M It compares the identity MME sends with the one included in UE's authentication message to make sure the MME requesting for authentication parameters is the MME that UE connects to.
• UE authentication The corresponding long-term shared key K is determined based on IMSI value that HSS receives. HSS the decrypts AUTH H to get RAND U and verifies with MAC U to confirm that the message is transmitted from a legal user with identity IMSI and that the user owns the key K.
• HSS calculates authentication token to send back to UE for network authentication -Generate current timestamp T H , random number
• HSS sends EK to MME HSS encrypts the key EK using the symmetric key EK M received from MME in the previous message. EK will be used by MME to authenticate UE. Again, EK is encrypted using EK M and sent along with a timestamp value to make sure that the key is fresh. 5. MME to UE: User Authentication Request (AUTH H , AUTH M , MAC M , aP) MME relies on the key EK received from HSS to calculate its own authentication vector.
MME then sends authentication vectors of itself and HSS to UE. Message authentication codes are included so that UE can verify the integrity and originality of the message. This step is the beginning step of the ECDH key exchange process. A random key a is selected from the set Z * P . Its corresponding public key aP is calculated and sent to UE. 6. UE to MME: User Authentication Response (AUTH UM , bP) After receiving the authentication request from MME, UE calculates the response to MME's authentication parameters. This is one of the most significant difference from the original EPS-AKA protocol where UE generates the response against HSS.
• UE authenticate HSS After decrypting AUTH H , UE will be able to derive RAND H and authenticate HSS using MAC H . UE will then follow the same key generation process as HSS to derive IK, CK and EK.
• UE authenticate MME Similar to HSS, UE can verify AUTH M and MAC M based on the key EK calculates at the previous step. It is assumed that the key EK can only be generated by HSS and UE and EK should be an authorized MME.
• Calculation of parameters for MME to authenticate UE UE first selects another random secret key b from the set Z * P and calculate the session key K UM with MME. The corresponding public key bP is also calculated and sent to MME.
. MME: UE Authentication MME calculates K UM base on the public key bP from UE and its own secret key a. MME then verifies UE by decrypting AUTH UM to confirm if the random value and timestamp is identical to what it has generated. After which, MME and UE have authenticated each other as HSS and UE. MME and UE also establish a common session key K UM using ECDH.
IV. SECURITY EVALUATION
The HEPS protocol is formally verified using the logic framework -BAN logic and AVISPA tool. BAN logic was developed by Burrows et al. [18] . Burrows et al. [18] is used to verify the protocol logically. AVISPA tool aids in verification of protocol systematically [19] .
A. LOGICAL PROOF
This section provides detailed explanation on the verification process of HEPS protocol using BAN logic. The HEPS protocol is first converted into its simplified form to be compatible with BAN logic representation, followed by logical derivation to validate the security goals achieved by HEPS.
1) FORMALIZED HEPS PROTOCOL
Irrelevant components are removed and some parts of the message is modified to convert the HEPS protocol into a BAN-logic-compatible form. U, M, H stand for UE, MME and HSS respectively. Due to the complexity in key generation process of the protocol, some assumptions need to be made to facilitate key agreement verification. Assumption 1 (Serving Network ID Secrets): Serving network ID ID M is assumed to be a secret between MME and HSS: MIDM ⇔ H. Hence, when H sees a message X attached with the secret IDM, it can be concluded that M once said M
The key EK used for message exchange between MME and UE is created by feeding the nonce values RAND U , RAND H and the secret key K (shared between UE and HSS) to several levels of key derivation functions.
When HSS receives the nonce value RAND U from U, it calculates EK and delivers EK to MME to enable MME's communication with UE. Hence it is reasonable to make the following assumptions:
If H believes that a secret key K, is shared between U and H, and H believes that U believes in the random nonce RANDu and H believes in the random nonce RAND H , then H believes that a secret key EK can be used for communication between U and M.
Similarly, U believes in the key EK if the following conditions are satisfied, equation shown at the bottom of this page.
If U believes that H believes that a secret key K is shared between U and H, and U believes that U believes in the random nonce RAND U and RAND H , then U believes that H believes a secret key EK can be used for communication between U and M.
Assumption 3 (EK Jurisdiction):
believes that H has jurisdiction over the secret key EK used for information exchange between U and M.
Assumption 4 (Session Key Generation): The session key between U and M is generated base on EK and two random nonce aP and bP (initiated by M and U respectively) using ECDH algorithm. Assume that U and M both believes that after public key exchange (aP and bP), ECDH algorithm will result in the same shared secret key at both sides.
Similarly, from M's side, if M believes in shared key EK, and M receives the nonce bP and verifies that it is generated by U for session key creation, and M believes in its self-generated nonce aP, then M believes in K UM .
Assumption 5 (Basic Assumptions):
3) HEPS PROTOCOL VERIFICATION Detailed explanation on the verification process is provided below:
Step 1: U to H: {{RAND U }_K, T U }_PKh: UE authentication
H can decrypt the message encrypted using its public key PKh. Applying Message Meaning Rule and Nonce -Verification Rule:
H sees {RAND U }_K, and H believes that the secret key K is shared between U and H, hence H believes that the messages come from a valid U and that U once said RAND U .
On the other hand, since H believes in the freshness of the timestamp T U , H also believes in the freshness of the whole message.
According to Nonce -Verification rule,
Up to this step, HSS has been able to verify the origin, freshness and trustworthiness of the first authentication message from UE.
Next is the step where H generates EK for M-U communication. We have proved that H believes the nonce RAND U it received is generated from a legal U for the current authentication proves: H| ≡ U| ≡ RAND U . Combining with the two assumptions H| ≡ U← K →H and H| ≡ RAND H , we can deduce that:
Hence H believes that the secret key EK can be used for communication between U and M.
Step 2: M to H: {ID M , T M , M← EKm →H}_PKh. Before this step, M generates a secret key EKm for communication between M and H. Since M encrypted the key EKm using H's public key, only H can decrypt the message and derive the key EKm for later usage. Hence it is acceptable to assume that M believes that secret key EKm is shared between only M and H and is able be used for communication between these two entities.
When H receives this message, the following verification process happens:
H confirms that the message comes from M and the message is fresh: MME authentication Similar to step 1, since the message is encrypted using H's public key, H is able to see the content of the message.
Now that we have the assumption ID M is a secret between M and H, we can apply the first assumption and conclude the message origin:
a: EKm CONFIRMATION
It is also assumed that M has jurisdiction over the secret key for message exchange between M and H (since M generates the key). According to the Jurisdiction Rule:
Step 
In conclusion, at the end of this message exchange, M believes that a key EK is generated by H for its message exchange with U.
Step 4: M to U AUTH H , {RAND M , T M }_EK, aP. UE authenticates network: base on AUTH H = {RAND U , RAND H , T H }_K U believes that a secret key K is shared between U and H. Hence when U receives a message encrypted with K, it can confirm that the message comes from H. U is able to decrypt the message and verify the value of the random nonce RAND U , to authenticate the network.
Message Meaning Rule and Nonce-Verification Rule can be used to verify message origin and freshness in this case (similar to UE authentication step), equation shown at the top of the next page
According to the assumption about session key generation, we have all the required condition to conclude that U believes in the key EK derived from RAND U , RAND H and K. Equation shown at the top of this pag Moreover, U believes that H has jurisdiction over U← EK →M. Applying the jurisdiction rule gives us the following result:
After this step, all the three entities, U, M and H has acknowledged that the key EK is a secret key used for message exchange between U and M.
b: MESSAGE ORIGIN AND MME AUTHENTICATION
Now that U has believed in the key EK shared between M and U, it can decrypt the second part of the message and authenticate M. Similar application of Message Meaning Rule and Nonce -Verification Rule, equation shown at the top of the next page.
Up to this step, UE is able to authenticate HSS and MME and ready to generate session key for further communication with MME.
c: SESSION KEY GENERATION
As proven, U believes that aP is generated by M for session key calculation and that the secret key EK is shared between U and M. Combining with the assumption that U believes in the nonce value bP it initiated, and the reliability of ECDH algorithm to generate the same secret key at both parties, we can conclude that U believes in the session key K UM .
Step By the end of this fifth message, M and U both agree on a session key K UM . In addition, M can also confirm that the other party U believes in key M| ≡ U| ≡ U← KUM →M. In conclusion, BAN logic has verified that the proposed protocol, HEPS, has achieved the following security goals: 1. Mutual authentication between user device and home network server (UE and HSS) 2. Mutual authentication between user device and serving network (UE and MME) 3. Fresh and secure session key established between user device and serving network for further conversations. The receiver of each message being exchanged in the HEPS protocol can verify the message's origin, freshness and the sender's trustworthiness. At the end of the authentication process, a session key is generated at user and serving network to be used for further communication. The key is verified to be fresh and secure.
Therefore, the HEPS protocol is logically accurate and is able to achieve all important authentication goals.
B. FORMAL VERIFICATION BY AVISPA
HEPS protocol has been verified logically using BAN logic and it is necessary to further derive the level of security of the protocol by testing its resistance under different malicious attack. This section explains the process of verifying the HEPS protocol using the formal verification tool AVISPA. The protocol is tested under different attack models, the outcomes of which is also included.
1) HEPS REPRESENTATION IN HLPSL
Due to some limitations of HLPSL in representing complex hash and key generation function, the HEPS protocol is simplified before converting into HLPSL language. The security goals to be achieved in this simulation are the authentication between UE and HSS, UE and MME as well as the secrecy of user identity IMSI.
a: ASSUMPTIONS
Symmetric Key EK generation
Since the EK generation process in HEPS is too complicated for ACISPA to model, it has been simplified VOLUME 7, 2019
Session Key generation
Since a shared secret is established between UE and MME after the ECDH key exchange, it is assumed that U and M have a pre-shared secret key K UM , which will be feed into a pre-defined function F 2 together with the key EK to generate session key. To verify the authentication protocol using the AVISPA tool, it is necessary to convert it from the message exchanged into a specific language HLPSL. The code structure is described below: FIGURE 2. HEPS protocol.
1. Entity Representation: Three entities in the authentication process are modeled. Security parameters owned by each entity are specified. Messages exchanged are converted into state-based transition. Each entity will change its state and perform necessary actions when it receives certain message.
Session composition:
A session is another type of role in AVISPA which comprises of all entity roles. It allocates the security parameters to corresponding entities. 3. Goal Specification The security goals are definedsecrecy of user identity IMSI, mutual authentication between UE and HSS, mutual authentication between UE and MME. 4. Environment construction Environment is the type of role where parameters are defined and allocated to session, which later initiate entity role creations. The intruder knowledge as well as different types of attacks can be defined in the environment role. The whole authentication process is simulated in AVISPA in Fig. 3 .
2) HEPS VERIFICATION BY AVISPA
The security of HEPS is analyzed by simulating it under different attack scenarios modeled by the AVISPA tool. This section focuses on the more common malicious attacks -DoS, replay, forge MME and MITM.
a: DOS SIMULATION
HEPS has certain ability to prevent DoS attack. In HEPS, HSS is able to derive IMSI right after it receives the user identity information. It can also verify if the request is sent from a legitimate user by analyzing MAC U . Therefore, HSS will discard messages from malicious users and its resources will be saved to serve legitimate user.
HEPS has the ability to determine the authenticity of coming requests at early stage of the authentication process and the conversation will be dropped if UE is not identified as a registered user. This is an improvement over the protocols in [8] , [9] , and [13] which force HSS to generate authentication vectors without any reference to user identity and therefore are vulnerable to DoS attack.
A simple DoS attack is modeled in AVISPA to test the resistance of the HEPS protocol. A new role DoS_UE is created with knowledge of all the public keys and functions in the protocol. When DoS_UE sends an authentication request to the MME, it is forward to HSS for verification. The conversation will be dropped at step 2. The reason HSS discards messages coming from DoS_UE is because it looks for a user authentication message in pre-determined format, which contains a legitimate IMSI and long-term secret key K. Since DoS_UE is unable to produce these secret parameters, its request will be dropped. Modulation of the session initiated by DoS_UE is showed in Fig 4. As indicated in the AVISPA simulation, there is no incoming event after MME receives the request from DoS_UE (Message 1). Therefore, HSS does not have to waste its resource to look for security parameters to authenticate UE and hence preventing DoS attack.
The reason Message 1 is not forwarded to HSS is because the message exchange in AVISPA is only indicated in simulation when it is received in its expected format. Since HSS is expecting an authentication message from a legitimate UE, which DoS_UE fails to provide, the communication where Message 1 is transferred to HSS is not shown in this simulation.
In conclusion, the improvement of HEPS over the protocols which uses symmetric cryptography to encrypt user identity [8] , [9] , [13] include the ability to detect illegitimate users quick and with ease without wasting home network server's resource. This is a desirable mechanism that can protect the authentication protocol against DoS attack.
b: REPLAY SIMULATION
HEPS security analysis has logically explained how the protocol can prevent replay attack using fresh random nonce and timestamps. This will be verified using AVOSPA tool.
Replay attack is launched by resending an authorized message from previous conversation. To detect potential replay attack, two sessions with the same input parameters are modeled in parallel in the environment role. If the HEPS protocol is vulnerable to replay attack, an adversary can take the messages sent by a legitimate entity of one session and delay or replay it in another session without being detected by other entities. This attack has been modeled both independently and together with other attacks in AVISPA. Both scenarios output SAFE condition.
The result of the separate modeling of replay attack against HEPS protocol is indicated in Fig. 5 .
As indicated in the AVISPA results, thousands of scenarios have been analyzed and no attack is found. Therefore, it can be concluded that the HEPS protocol is resistant to replay attack.
c: FORGE MME SIMULATION
The current EPS-AKA protocol some security vulnerabilities that allow adversary to impersonate MME to establish conversation with UE and acquire confidential information. To test the HEPS protocol under forge MME attack, a session with intruder playing the role of MME is simulated in AVISPA. In this simulation, the intruder plays the role of MME and is able to see all the messages being sent to MME as well as the messages in another legitimate session.
AVISPA concluded and output SAFE after the testing. Therefore, it can be concluded that the HEPS protocol is resistant to MME forge station attack.
d: MITM SIMULATION
The AVISPA tool uses Dolev-Yao intruder model, which assumes that the intruder is able to see all information exchange in the network and is able to truncate, append and reroute the messages.
Since all the messages being exchanged in HEPS is encrypted, it is impossible for the intruder to interpret the content. Each message has the integrity protecting component, which is the MAC -output of hash function. Even small change in original message will lead to significant change of the hash output. Therefore, the receiver is able to verify if the message has been modified during transmission. Another important component that protect messages against the intruder is the timestamp. Even if the intruder is able to reroute and replay all the message in the network, the receiver can always determine the freshness of the message based on this component. As a result, MITM attack can be prevented. In other words, the HEPS protocol is resistant to eavesdropping and data modification attack.
3) VERIFICATION RESULT
Different attack models have been simulated using the AVISPA tool. The HEPS protocol is marked as safe when being put under different security conditions -Do attack, MITM attack, Replay attack and Forge MME attack as well as the combinations of them.
Compared to some protocols like [8] , [9] , and [13] HEPS has much greater capability of detecting and handling DoS attack due to its strict authentication requirements that allow home network to recognize user at fairly early stage of the authentication process. Thanks to the implementation of a hybrid cryptosystem, HEPS also protects the confidentiality and integrity of the messages being transmit via the network, which efficiently prevents MITM attacks. A new componenttimestamp, is integrated in each message to prevent any possibility of Replay attack. Finally, serving network authentication is added to handle Forge MME attack against the network.
The HEPS protocol was simulated under each of these attack models in AVISPA. The results of separate simulations are provided above. All kinds of mentioned attacks are also run simultaneously to test the resiliency of HEPS protocol. OFMC and Atse are used as back-end mechanisms. Authentication and secrecy goals are achieved and the result are shown Fig 6. Therefore, the HEPS protocol has been formally verified using AVISPA tool to be resistant to many malicious attacks like MITM, forge MME, replay and DoS attacks. Although there are more complicated attacks which could not be modeled using the AVISPA tool, it is reasonable to conclude that HEPS is a secure protocol that can prevent most types of common attacks and able to achieve all authentication goals.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We will provide the detail on how the HEPS protocol achieve security goals of user identity protection, Perfect Forward Secrecy and mutual authentication. The protocol's ability to prevent different kinds of attacks -Replay, MITM is also validated.
1) USER IDENTITY PROTECTION
The implementation of public key infrastructure fully protect user identity IMSI. Since IMSI is encrypted using HSS's public key, only the legitimate HSS can use its matching secret key to decrypt the message.
Improvement of the HEPS protocol over existing proposals that implement symmetric key cryptography such as [8] , [9] , and [13] include reduction in computation requirement in HSS and protection against DoS attack. In HEPS protocol, home network server can authenticate the user from the second step of the authentication process. With reduced calculation in HSS for each authentication request and HSS's ability to identify user at early stage, the possibility of a successful DoS attack against HEPS will be reduced significantly compared to [8] , [9] , and [13] .
With public key infrastructure, HEPS provides the same level of IMSI protection as the protocols that use asymmetric key cryptography. However, HEPS uses minimal public key encryption and this would reduce the setup cost and induces less overhead compared to other protocols. For example, compared to the SE-EPS-AKA protocol in [7] and EC-AKA2 protocol, the HEPS protocol has proven to have better performance due to reduced usage of public key encryption. The evidence and proof will be provided in subsequence section.
2) PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY
Key derivation algorithm implemented in HEPS ensures Perfect Forward Secrecy for the authentication process, which is an improvement over existing solutions. The hybrid key exchange algorithm should be applied in session key generation process to decouple the session keys from the long-term master key K.
The HEPS protocol implements ECDH during UE-MME authentication process so that a fresh session key is generated for each conversation. The key itself is calculated at UE and MME separately and never transmitted. This implementation will remove the dependency on the long term shared key K and add another layer of security to protect session keys. Under the HEPS scheme, previous conversation will not be compromised even when the long-term key K is exposed.
3) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
The HEPS protocol provides strong mutual authentication between UEE and HSS. Each party challenges the other using a parameter encrypted by their shared secret key K.
Mutual authentication between UE and MME is also ensured. A symmetric key EK is securely transferred from HSS to MME to delegate the authentication duty to MME. Similar to the authentication process between HSS and UE, MME and UE rely on this shared secret EK to verify each other.
4) PREVENT REPLAY ATTACK
The HEPS protocol is resistant against replay attacks due to the timestamp component attached to every message being exchanged. The recipient can compare the timestamp included in the message to its own current timestamp and verify the currency of the message. If an adversary tries to resend a message from previous conversation, the recipient can easily determine that this is a replay message by looking at the timestamp and discard the message to prevent the replay attack.
5) PREVENT REPLAY ATTACK
All messages being transmitted in HEPS protocol is encrypted. This implementation greatly enhances the security level of the AKA process, preventing any MITM attacks and safeguards the confidentiality of the information. VOLUME 7, 2019 Compared to EPS-AKA protocol where several messages are exchanged in plain format, both via wire and wireless interfaces, the proposed protocol is more secure.
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) calculated by hash function is added to each message transmitted in order for the receiver to verify the origin and integrity of the message. Therefore, an adversary listening to a conversation can never derive the transmitted messages or manipulate them. This prevent MITM attack.
In summary, the proposed HEPS protocol is able to achieve all the authentication goals of the LTE access procedure. Additionally, the security level has been improved compared to the original EPS-AKA protocol. The HEPS protocol has eliminated the single point of failure in the authentication process, which is the long-term shared key between user device and home network server, and enforced a critical security feature -Perfect Forward Secrecy. The protocol is also able to prevent most of the common malicious attacks -MITM, DoS, Masquerade.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The HEPS protocol has been verified and require further analysis to test its limitation. To prove that performance of HEPS is optimized, comparisons to other protocols that uses similar approach are included. The analysis will include overall delay and resources consumption. Simulations in MATHLAB regarding average delay as well as power and bandwidth consumption under different security scenarios have been executed and will be shown below.
A. AUTHENTICATION DELAY
Finding the balance between security and performance is always a challenge. With more requirements in security and the enhancement in equipment capacity, the idea of using asymmetric key cryptography in LTE access authentication is more likely to be accepted. It has been applied in several existing proposals, such asSE-EPS, EC-AKA et al. Performance of these proposals will be compared to the HEPS protocol [7] , [10] , [14] . In our proposed HEPS protocol, authentication delay is reduced by minimizing the use of public key encryption. The protocol only requires public keys of HSS to be distributed to legal UEs and MMEs. Hence the system complexity and setup cost is reduced even more compared to EC-AKA and EC-AKA2. HEPS uses the authentication information request from MME (second message) to send a symmetric key to HSS to be used in future message exchanges. In the next step, HSS again adopts this symmetric key to transfer another symmetric key to be used in authentication process between UE and MME. This hybrid cryptosystem will ensure message confidentiality while not adding too much overhead to the procedure's performance. A brief comparison of cryptographic functions used in 3 protocols: SE-EPS, EC-AKA and HEPS can be found in the table below.
In conclusion, HEPS has the best performance among the protocols that use asymmetric cryptosystem. It is able to minimize the system set up cost and total delay of the authentication process.
B. REDUCED MESSAGE SIZE USING HASH FUNCTION
Instead of implementing integrity check by using pre-shared encryption function and integrity key [14] in EC-AKA2 protocol, we use hash function in our HEPS protocol to do integrity check calculation. As hash function is known to be faster than encryption and decryption and it produces a fixed size output, which is much smaller than the original message, using hash function in integrity check will improve the overall performance of the authentication process as well as saving the transmission bandwidth and delay overhead on the next steps [7] .
C. BANDWIDTH CONSUMPTION REDUCTION BY USING DYNAMIC AUTHENTICATION PARAMETERS
Bandwidth consumption between MME and HSS has been significantly reduced in HEPS. The protocol has removed SQN mechanism and the use of Authentication Vectors (AVs). This practice in HEPS will reduce the number of times MME has to interact with HSS, and also the size of the messages being exchanged between these two entities in each interaction.
Firstly, eliminating SQN and AVs will reduce the number of times MME has to request for authentication parameters from HSS. In EPS-AKA protocol, whenever there is SQN desynchronization in UE, MME has to send request to HSS to fetch a new set of AVs for later authentication attempts. Without SQN, the mismatch problem is eliminated and MME does not have to come to HSS when UE says that its SQN number is incorrect. Another scenario where MME has to request for new authentication parameters from HSS is when UE stays in the serving network for too long and all the previous AVs have been used or expired. The proposed HEPS protocol eliminates the use of AVs and delegates authentication authority and responsibility to MME. As a result, MME does not have to make multiple request to HSS because it can calculate the authentication parameters by itself.
Secondly, by removing the use of authentication vectors, the size of message 3 (authentication information response from HSS to MME) is scaled down. Instead of sending multiple authentication vectors, HSS in HEPS can just send a message with the size of one single AV. To be more specific, each AV contains authentication token of HSS, random number generated by HSS and session key K ASME .
AV(i) = AUTH(i), RAND(i), K ASME While the message 3 of HEPS contains:
Therefore, HEPS has reduced the size of message 3 by n times. (n is the number of authentication vectors sent in EPS-AKA). With the number of message exchanges and message size reduced, the proposed HEPS protocol has optimize the bandwidth between MME and HSS.
D. TIME DELAY AND POWER CONSUMPTION USING MATHLAB SIMULATIONS 1) SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Matlab is used as the simulation tool. The cryptographic functions and counterpart time consumption and power consumption statistics used in the simulation are listed in Table 2 . Assumptions has to be made for time consumption of ECDH key calculation. Compared to RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (EEC) guarantees faster computation [20] . Hence, it is fair to assume that ECDH key generation process is relatively faster than RSA. Using the worst-case figure, which is the decryption overload of RSA, ECDH 192-bit key generation roughly takes 15.5ms. Specifications for SHA and AES are based on statistics in [21] and [22] and RSA is from simulation result in OpenSSL -a cryptography library and toolkit [23] .
The massage length assumptions is listed in Table 3 .
2) TIME CONSUMPTION COMPARISON AND ATTACK RESISTANCE ANALYSIS a: TIME CONSUMPTION COMPARISON BY STEPS
Summary of the time consumption of the two protocols can be found in the Table 4 below. It is noticed that the most significant improvement of HEPS over EC-AKA2 is that symmetric key cryptography is used over asymmetric. In general, HEPS takes lesser time to complete the authentication process compared to EC-AKA2.
b: ATTACK RESISTANCE ANALYSIS
The two protocols are further analyzed in terms of attack resistance. Although both protocols have been verified using formal verification tools, it is still possible in real life situation that an unknown attack might occur. Assume that an attack is a known attack if a protocol has the security mechanism to prevent it and an attack is unknown if it cannot be determined or the protocol design is not fully resistant to the attack. Under these unknown attacks, the authentication process might not be executed until the end.
Assume that if the execution of the authentication protocol breaks, another authentication round is initiated. This process will continue until the user is successfully authenticated. Therefore, if the number of unknown attacks increases, the average time required for a successful authentication round will also increase (more authentication attempts need to be made).
Assume that if a known attack comes in the middle of protocol execution, the protocol is able to prevent it and successfully finishes its last step. Otherwise, if an unknown attack comes, the protocol will break at a random step.
Using these assumptions, the two protocols are simulated in MATLAB under different security conditions. A parameter is set up to indicate the percentage of unknown attacks in real life situation. It can be derived from the resulting figure in MATLAB that HEPS is more capable of preventing the overall delay from going uncontrollably high under different attacks simulation. It has been analyzed and proved that HEPS is able to enforce the 3 security goals Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication and is resistant to many common types of attacks like MITM, replay attacks. Therefore, the percentage of unknown attacks should not be too high in real life situation. It can be seen from Fig. 7 that average execution time for HEPS doesn't increase much if the number of unknown attacks is less than or equal to half of the total attack. On the other hand, EC-AKA2 execution time increases significantly when more unknown attacks come, reaching more than 300ms (more than 1.5 times compared to normal execution time) when the percentage of unknown attacks is 50%. In conclusion, the proposed protocol HEPS performs better than EC-AKA in terms of execution time and attack resistance. The conclusion is supported by simulations using MATLAB software.
3) POWER CONSUMPTION COMPARISON AND ATTACK RESISTANCE ANALYSIS
The power required for computation of two protocol, EC-AKA and HEPS are compared and simulated under various security scenarios in MATLAB.
a: POWER CONSUMPTION COMPARISON BY STEPS
The following table summarized the power consumption (in µWs) in each step of the authentication process. It can be easily noticed that the HEPS has greater improvement over EC-AKA due to the elimination of public key encryption and decryption.
Due to the significant difference between power consumed in asymmetric and symmetric cryptography and the fact that HEPS minimizes the use of public key encryption, HEPS reduced almost two third of the power consumption compared to EC-AKA. It can be concluded from the Fig. 8 that the HEPS protocol consumes significantly less power compared to EC-AKA2. This is due to the hybrid cryptographic systems and the compactness of messages to be exchanged in HEPS. Under the scenario where percentage of unknown attacks increases and more than one authentication rounds need to be performed before a user is successfully authenticated, the difference in performance of HEPS and EC-AKA2 is even greater, which shows that HEPS is more capable of handling unexpected security scenarios without consuming too much resources.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The aim of this paper is to deliver a security protocol for one of the most popular and cutting-edge technologies today -LTE network. Current network vulnerabilities have been identified at the beginning of the project and later researches focus on different approaches to counter these vulnerabilities. The paper emphasizes on the objection of performance optimization as it is one of the top priorities in wireless network design.
A considerable amount of knowledge has been analyzed and filtered in order to select the most suitable security parameters. It is able to produce a secure and resourceconstraint0aware authentication protocol. Decisions have been made to combine the most effective parameters and functions into a new authentication protocol HEPS. The proposed HEPS protocol is able to protect the system against different kinds of attack and additionally, minimize resource consumed and overall delay of the process. The protocol has been verified logically and systematically using BAN logic and AVISPA tool. Its performance is further compared to existing protocols in terms of overall delay, bandwidth and power consumption.
